

103  
**CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA: RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS**

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Conflict Resolution in Africa: Rece... D

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

**H.R. 4541**

**To authorize assistance to promote the peaceful  
resolution of conflicts in Africa**

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JUNE 8, 1994

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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## CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry L. Johnston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I call the meeting to order. The subcommittee meets today to consider issues pertaining to conflict resolution in Africa. We will also markup the African Conflict Resolution Act.

War continues to plague the Continent of Africa to an extent that can only be described as horrific. The ongoing carnage in Rwanda and the continued killing in southern Sudan are current examples of a decades-old tragedy.

Africa has suffered more than 20 major civil wars since 1960. War-related humanitarian disasters cause untold suffering for innocent civilians. Economic development, even food production is usually impossible in a nation at war.

War in Africa has also placed a huge burden on the international community. In Somalia alone the United States spent over \$1.5 billion. The numerous United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa are a costly, if necessary, burden on many nations. Humanitarian assistance to war-ravaged countries adds billions more to the cost of these wars.

By focusing on conflict resolution, I hope the United States can help reduce the enormous human and financial cost of war in Africa. We must focus on helping Africans build institutions that can resolve African conflicts. We must do so for two reasons.

First, Africans know best how to deal with their own conflicts. The OAU, for example, under the dynamic leadership of Salim Salim has recently made significant strides in adopting a conflict resolution mechanism. Second, the political constraints on future U.S. and United Nations intervention in Africa are severe. The best, if not only, choice is to help build African conflict resolution capabilities.

The legislation that we will markup today does exactly this. The bill authorizes assistance for the following purposes: To help build the OAU conflict resolution capability; to do the same for African subregional organizations; to promote the process of demobilization in Africa; to provide training for Africans in conflict resolution; and

to fund nongovernmental organizations involved in mediation in Africa.

This legislation is an excellent long-term investment for both the United States and the countries of Africa and I urge my colleagues to strongly support this bill.

Today, we will first hear from the Hon. George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. We will then hear from Mr. James Woods, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for African Affairs and a distinguished expert on the issues before us. Ambassador Moose.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to address the committee on the subject of conflict resolution in Africa. It is a central issue for those of us involved in African policy, but one that has not always received the attention it warrants.

I would especially like to commend the committee for its consistent leadership on this issue. Your proposed 1994 legislative initiative in particular could prove to be very helpful in strengthening our approach to conflict resolution and military downsizing in Africa.

The administration has put a premium on conflict resolution, making it one of the top three priorities of President Clinton's foreign policy agenda. Given the growing burden of conflict resolution, it has become necessary, and I think useful, to look at the future role of regional organizations in dealing with these difficult problems.

The Organization of African Unity, as the region's preeminent political institution, is in a unique position to defuse conflicts before they start or conduct early intervention in African conflicts, thereby reducing the magnitude of human suffering and the level of destruction. For that reason, we are helping the OAU to develop a credible capability to plan, coordinate and supervise efforts in conflict resolution and, eventually develop a peacekeeping capability.

In fiscal year 1994, the United States is providing the OAU with \$3.5 million which consists of \$2 million in nonassessed peacekeeping funding to strengthen the OAU's capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations and an additional \$1.5 million in economic support funds to assist the OAU in the establishment and operation of a civilian conflict resolution mediation center at its headquarters in Addis Ababa. This latter funding will be used to purchase equipment, train civilian staff, and create procedures and software to enhance the OAU's ability to track crisis situations and communicate with OAU representatives in the field.

Funds from the fiscal year 1994 voluntary peacekeeping account will provide equipment and training for OAU observer and peacekeeping missions undertaken as directed by the OAU conflict resolution mechanism. Portions of these funds have been expended to support OAU mediation efforts in Burundi and in Somalia.



Building on the conflict resolution initiative contained in last year's House authorization bill, the administration has proposed an additional \$5 million to the OAU for fiscal year 1995. This would provide another \$1.5 million in support of conflict prevention and mediation and an additional \$3.5 million to enhance the organization's peacekeeping capabilities.

The administration also has proposed \$10 million in fiscal year 1995 regional peacekeeping funding that would provide materiel and training assistance on a bilateral basis to selected African countries. This support will assist the development of credible, well-trained African units capable of participating in international and regional conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.

While we recognize the real and potential contributions of regional organizations, we have also explored the possible contributions of subregional organizations especially in the field of preventive mediation. ECOMOG's peacekeeping effort in Liberia, for example, was undertaken prior to the OAU's accepting the responsibility for conflict resolution and has since helped in the process of restoring peace to that country.

We would like to retain the option of channeling our support to the subregional organizations. We do not wish to encourage them to become inadvertent competitors with the OAU for scarce conflict resolution resources. Rather, we would like to ensure that regional mediation and conflict resolution efforts are undertaken in a closely coordinated fashion.

Military downsizing has become a key issue in many African countries. Downsizing reduces the economic burdens on the resources of a state and rationalizes the force structure in accordance with a realistic threat assessment. Military downsizing also supports efforts to enhance democratization in Africa since politicized militaries often are the greatest threats to democracy within African States.

We are committed to assisting African countries downsize and reintegrate their militaries and we will continue to support demobilization efforts.

Education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for personnel of countries of sub-Saharan Africa are also extremely important. We will undertake to work with our colleagues at the Defense Department to create a conflict resolution and peacekeeping education and training program that can be presented to Africans and other foreign personnel.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, Africa has an established tradition of informal mediation of conflict by eminent African figures, diplomats and statesmen. Providing funding assistance to such efforts could build on that successful tradition. It is an area we will continue to investigate as we study a full range of conflict resolution and prevention issues.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the crises in Angola, Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda demonstrate that international peacekeeping remains a critical instrument for maintaining international security and averting humanitarian disasters. Our challenge is to make it a more effective instrument. I believe that the broad outlines of the proposed legislation contain a number of helpful ideas that will

prove useful as we work to enhance U.S. support for conflict resolution in Africa.

I look forward to working with you and with the subcommittee to make our commitment to conflict resolution stronger and more effective. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moose appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much.

Before I call on members for questions, Mr. Payne has an opening statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We both apologize for being late. We were both at the same meeting and we hope you accept our apologies.

Let me first thank you, Mr. Chairman. With the genocide going on in Rwanda, continued civil conflict in Sudan, Angola and Liberia, nothing is more relevant to consider than how we can enable Africa to take charge of resolving their own conflicts. Also political conflicts preventing Democratic societies such as we have seen, such as we have between western Sahara and Morocco, and the internal conflicts in Algeria, Zaire and Nigeria are in need of a new approach to deal with these problems.

As we depart from the cold war days when bilateral influence was exerted to counter the moves of the former Soviet Union, we should now look forward to a genuine multilateral approach that enables Africa to be the architect of its own destiny. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of providing significant financial resources to the organization of African unity in order to carry out their responsibility. When we consider the damage done to Africa by pursuing the cold war, surely appropriate reparations are called for at this time.

It is not practical to sit back and expect African countries that can hardly meet their own payrolls for civil servants to foot the entire bill at the OAU. More funds are needed also to assist in demobilization of the large armies that were created to fight the cold war, namely Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. I have seen the sadness and desperation of these troops in many countries sitting waiting and waiting for an opportunity to return to their homes and receive full employment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on the legislation you are presenting for markup, the African Conflict Resolution Act. To authorize assistance to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa will go a long way toward righting many of the wrongs I have cited. The bill is well thought out and researched. Several authorities have been consulted and the bill—the additional \$28.5 million in funding this bill will authorize—should be easily diverted from some of the less than important projects.

I also note that an attempt will be made to further build Africans' indigenous conflict resolution expertise by linking an American or an African university to develop a conflict management program in an African university. Likewise, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can involve some black land grant colleges, the historically black colleges or some other appropriate African-American universities in the United States to take part in this forward looking program. This would be a significant step forward in furthering black exper-

tise and also in our quest to develop a constituency for Africa in the United States, which is very much needed.

I think that if we did have a conflict resolution system working at the OAU, I don't think that our U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations would have to characterize one of her statements as dialing 911 and getting no response at the U.N. I think that it was a very sad way to respond to a conflict in Rwanda where 500,000 people have died and genocide is taking place to talk about a system that is not working right and use the analogy of dialing 911.

If the OAU were empowered and had the resources, perhaps she wouldn't have to dial that number.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Burton, ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. BURTON. One of my colleagues is stuck in California and he asked me to make a couple of comments, since he couldn't be here. He said the total troops in the 13 countries currently in conflict or which have recently either ended conflict and/or held elections is approximately 450,000. If we were to demilitarize one-half of these troops, which would be a reasonable target, the proposed funds would work out to \$112 per soldier or \$224 for the 2-year covered period. That is inclusive of program costs. There is no known job creation program that costs this little. Thus this may be viewed as inadequate or symbolic and thus not cost or management effective.

I have been on this subcommittee now for 10 years and we have tried every way in the world to solve these problems. We have thrown money at different problems. We have tried different approaches and every single thing we try seems to end up costing money, but really achieving very little if anything.

I look at the situation in Rwanda where the Hutus and the Tutsis are at war and hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and I think that this kind of an approach simply isn't going to solve that problem. The American taxpayer is asked year after year to pony up this money, which they do, because they are humanitarian, they are concerned about the problems in Somalia. They are concerned about the genocide in Rwanda. They are concerned about the war that went on in Mozambique and Angola and they are concerned about the apartheid problem in South Africa and the famine that we saw in Ethiopia that led to a bloody civil war.

These problems usually aren't resolved by us, but by internal forces working things out or one side or the other winning the war. It just seems to me that if we are going to approach this problem from this perspective, this is not enough money. If it is not enough money, it appears to me that we are pouring more money down a rat hole, because it is not going to solve the problem. So it seems to me we shouldn't do it halfway. Either do it all the way or don't do it at all.

In this case, after my experience over these past 10 years it seems to me that even though this money had been appropriated, and it is money that is already there, that it is not going to be the right way to solve this problem because the American taxpayer is going to be spending \$25 to \$30 million and I don't believe it is going to solve the problem. So although I think this is well-inten-

tioned and I know the gentleman who proposed this worked with Hank Cohen and Mr. Moose, I can't in good conscience support this effort, although we all want to see conflicts resolved before they get out of hand like in Rwanda. We want to see the horrible atrocities stopped, but this isn't going to solve the problem. And I think in another year we will be coming back and saying that didn't work, let's try something else.

It is taxpayers' money. We have to start saying, this is not manna from heaven, not something coming out of the skies. This is the blood and sweat of American taxpayers and if it is going to solve the problem, if we are going to stop the carnage going on in Somalia and elsewhere, let's do it, but if it is not going to work and if we don't have any guarantees of that, then let's wait until we have some kind of an idea that it will work.

Every single thing we have tried ends up spending money and the problems and carnage and famines continue and atrocities continue and the taxpayers say the deficit gets bigger and there is no positive result. I know this is kind of a rambling on statement and I apologize for that, Mr. Chairman, but my frustration level gets pretty high when we say the money is already appropriated, \$800 million. We don't have to worry about it; it has been appropriated. But it is still taxpayers' money and if it is not necessary to spend it and if it is not going to be used effectively, let's don't spend it. Let's hold onto it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Would you yield for a question?

Mr. BURTON. I will be happy to yield for a question.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I quoted at least 3 times that you said there was not enough money to underwrite the conflict resolution. Do I anticipate an amendment from you to increase the amount?

Mr. BURTON. You know, you always come up with these questions after I make my opening statement and you get a laugh out of the audience, but the fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, I don't appreciate that. You can make the comments you want to make.

My position is, I have been here 10 years, longer than you have. I have seen conflict after conflict. I have seen famine. I have seen starvation. I have seen pestilence, and we have thrown American taxpayer dollars at it ad infinitum, and the results have not been changed.

I don't believe if we spent a lot of money in Rwanda we would stop the Hutus and Tutsis from killing each other to the degree that they have. And until we come up with a plan that looks like it is going to work, I don't think we ought to spend the American taxpayer dollars on it. We have been doing it now for the 10 years I have been on this subcommittee, and the money has not been effectively used. So I say if we are going to do it, do it right and if we are not going to do it right, don't waste the taxpayers' money.

Mr. PAYNE. Would you yield? You mentioned 10 years and nothing has worked. When I see the elections that just occurred in South Africa where we put in money, \$80 million a year for the last couple of years to try to see that we had an election that worked, 2 or 3 years ago I was there when Namibia sent up its flag and you have probably the greatest constitution ever written in that

country because it took a part of everybody's constitution. It even says he and she in it. It doesn't say "he" like ours.

Malawi changed over from a one-party system, a nice transition, the live President steps down without any conflict. Zambia just had an election where Frederick Chiluba was elected and the former President stepped down. We had invested some money there. Eritrea has ended its civil war and is trying to demobilize its army. Ethiopia has stopped, Mozambique.

My point is simply when you use a very all-encompassing statement that we put money in and nothing has worked, I think you mislead people who may be viewing this for the first time and may not be as knowledgeable of Africa or the world as you are, and they may wonder why are we spending this money. We don't want to take a look at what is spent on NATO and the lack of power sharing. We spend more supporting NATO and the Pacific Rim in 1 year than we spent in the past 30.

Mr. BURTON. Reclaiming my time, if you go back to Ethiopia and go down the list, in Ethiopia there was a civil war that went on there and the conflict was resolved internally, not from our assistance and our money. The Eritrean rebels were so strong and we weren't even supporting them at one time, and they ended up prevailing.

Namibia, conflict resolution money did not solve that problem. That problem was solved because over a period of time pressure was brought to bear by SWAPO, the United Nations and others to force a free and fair election.

In South Africa it wasn't money that solved that problem, it was internal and external pressure. And we may or may not agree on whether or not sanctions may not be the right approach. Nevertheless, it wasn't money that did it. Malawi, money didn't solve that problem. Money wouldn't have solved the problem in Rwanda or Somalia and we spent tons of money on that.

I am saying that before we start throwing American taxpayers' dollars at it, let's see if we can explore every other avenue and force people to negotiate a settlement without bloody conflict. If that doesn't work and we can afford it, and if it is going to work and if we have a good chance of success, then talk, as a last resort, of American taxpayers' dollars, but that is not the way we do it. We always go to the well first.

Mr. PAYNE. I am sorry time doesn't permit, but I would certainly have a different opinion. I think that Baker and Shevardnadze talked about Ethiopia. That didn't just happen internally. It was a whole operation that saw that Mengistu would leave and the whole thing. We don't have time to debate—there was money involved in all of these activities that was spent and we talk about money—we wouldn't have a peaceful solution coming up in Israel where we spend \$5 billion a year between Israel and Egypt. We are having a resolution—

Mr. BURTON. We are not talking about Israel and the Middle East right now.

Mr. PAYNE. I was just using your broad philosophical concept that money has been wasted in Africa. I wanted to just remind you about places where 100 times more money is spent annually than

what all 60 countries in Africa get together in a year. That is my only point. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Welcome to the Subcommittee on Africa.

Mr. BURTON. Congressman Payne and I do agree and Congressman Johnston and I agree on certain things. There was a time we supported the President of Zaire. Now, we find that the extravagance of that fellow and the waste of money never solved a bit of the problems of the people there. The money went into his pocket and 15 or 16 estates around the world and the people there are starving. The inflation rate is out of control. The disease rate is going up and we poured billions of dollars—

Mr. PAYNE. We never agreed on that one.

Mr. BURTON. You understand what I am saying.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me recapture the subcommittee. Mr. Burton is right; we have agreed on some things. Recently, giving \$1 million to Eritrea, we both signed a letter for demobilization, as I recall. This morning I met with the opposition party of Mozambique and I think it was your request that we give them \$1 million so they would be on a playing field. There are several instances where we have agreed.

The thing that—I assume Mr. Royce is doing the mathematics on where it comes out to \$112 per person to demobilize.

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The development funds for Africa is \$800 million for 600 million people and that comes out to \$1.30 per person. So I don't think we have flooded them with that much money that they are drowning.

Ambassador Moose, I notice you condensed your testimony. We will put the entire testimony in the record.

Questions for Ambassador Moose. Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I think Ambassador Moose knows my views and I understand his as well.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We will give him his Miranda rights.

Mr. BURTON. He is a fine man, and I have the highest regard for him.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Incidentally, I don't ask these questions to get an audience response, Mr. Burton, or anything like that. If you feel that way, I apologize.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. May I switch the subject briefly. We have had one hearing and one briefing on Rwanda and before I get back to this, could you bring us up to date? I know I am hitting you cold, but could you tell us what is happening? We have been out a week and it has been a couple of weeks since the last briefing.

Mr. MOOSE. What I hope is happening today, Mr. Chairman, is that the United Nations Security Council will be considering the latest report of the Secretary General on a specific plan for a U.N. operation in Rwanda. That plan benefits from the recent visit to the region of two of the Secretary General's most senior advisors and benefits from a lot of consultation with U.S. experts from the Defense Department, NSC, State Department and other agencies. It aims to do something which we have been saying from the outset; namely, to try to afford some degree of protection to the people

most at risk, particularly those civilians who have been caught behind the battle lines in various parts of the country.

In the meantime, we understand that the Secretary General, with the assistance of the OAU, has secured the commitments in principle of some 14 countries to contribute troops to that operation. We and the United Nations and others have been pressing the parties to accept this operation. We have verbally received those commitments. Obviously, the results of these undertakings will be seen when the United Nations begins to try to deploy the troops it is seeking.

I think that we share a profound frustration with the U.N. and others with the length of time it has taken to come to an agreement that both the parties and the neighboring countries will endorse. But we have not relaxed our persistence of that objective and we will continue to work with the United Nations and with others to try to bring that about.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Any questions to the Ambassador about Rwanda?

Mr. BURTON. I have one quick question. We are here talking about conflict resolution and funds for that purpose. You know the problem with the Hutus and the Tutsis and the generational problem. It is in other countries surrounding that area. It is a tribal thing. Do you believe that if we had used conflict resolution funds we could have headed this off? And if so, how?

Mr. MOOSE. In point of fact we did make a very significant effort with others, to support a negotiated solution in Rwanda. And we thought that we were on the right track. The rebel forces and the government reached an agreement last August. We were pressing for implementation of that. We had supported the implementation. We had supported the plan submitted to, and approved by, the Security Council.

In this instance I have to say that our collective efforts failed. The fact that they failed in Rwanda, in my judgment, does not, in my judgment, suggest that the effort was not worth it or that we should not seek to try to do similar kinds of conflict prevention and peacekeeping in other areas. I think there are a number of cases in which we have seen that those efforts have succeeded.

I was intimately involved in the process of negotiating the agreements on Namibia. That effort involved not only diplomatic initiatives, but a very strenuous, vigorous United Nations involvement in peacekeeping. But for that effort, I don't think we would have seen the kind of stable Democratic Namibia that we see today.

I believe that the effort that is now underway in Mozambique has every opportunity to succeed and in so doing will resolve one of the bloodiest conflicts that the continent has seen. Although we are further away from a solution in Angola, I do think that the attempt to try to bring an end to that conflict and the investment we and others are prepared to make in that effort is worthwhile.

Conflict resolution is a very uncertain business and it does not mean that we will always be successful. But I think the benefits of success far outweigh the disadvantages of not trying at all.

Mr. BURTON. I don't want you or the administration to misunderstand. I think the United Nations, the United States of America, our State Department, working to get the sides together in an elective process to head off a war is a reasonable objective. The prob-

lem that I have is that we put large sums of money into these things when the negotiation process seems to me to be the best way to solve the problem.

As you said, in Rwanda, you conducted negotiations, you thought you had an agreement. That didn't cost an arm and a leg. It didn't cost hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayers' money. So the success that you tried to achieve didn't work out, but nevertheless the effort was made. If American taxpayers' dollars will help eliminate the possibility of war and we know there is going to be tangible results or there is a good chance of tangible results, I don't have any problem.

In Mozambique, that war went on for 4 years. In fact, Declama is here for the first time. We are finally going to get to meet him. I plan to meet him tomorrow. I am happy that the Rome talks worked out. But as far as putting money into the Mozambiquean conflict, that wouldn't have solved the problem. It would have just been putting money into a problem that was unsolvable at the time. Same thing in Angola and elsewhere.

My point is before we start putting American taxpayers' dollars in large sums into these things, let's try every other avenue first and get the parties involved to agree that  $x$  number of dollars is going to help solve the problem. And if it isn't, then don't use the taxpayers' dollars. That is my point.

Mr. MOOSE. If I could respond just briefly. I don't disagree fundamentally with what you are suggesting. In point of fact, in every one of the efforts in which we have been engaged, diplomacy has been the key. One of the purposes of supporting the OAU and enhancing its capacity to engage in preventive diplomacy is to give us an added capability where I think one is still very much needed.

At the same time, just to use the example of Rwanda, it did require some investment on our part. We put \$1 million into support for the OAU's buffer zone of observation monitoring of that cease-fire agreement. So I think it is correct that we need to be sure that the ways in which we are investing and using money are as cost-effective as we can possibly make them, but I think it also is important to understand that we are dealing in an area where there are no guarantees and no certainties.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. On that ethnic conflict there, when we get to Africa there are tribal wars, but in Europe it is ethnic. I think it is ethnic in Europe. It ought to be ethnic in Africa. If you are going to use tribal, let's use it all around and Asia, Europe and all the rest of the places.

You know, this whole question about this being an ethnic conflict, it would appear to me that the initial flare up of the final situation that created so much carnage, in my opinion, was not ethnic. I think it was some people were in power and they want to stay in power. It was simply a power play because allegedly Hutus killed the Hutu President. It wasn't done by the other ethnic group.

The only reason, supposedly, that it was done was because the Hutu President decided the ARUSHA accord should go into effect to be inclusive of the Tutsis and to bring in the Rwanda Patriotic Front from Uganda and have them share in power. I think we sometimes—it broke down into long-time, deep-seated problems



that were reinforced by European colonialist as far back as the 1800's when the Germans reinforced the Tutsis to control the 85 percent Hutus and made the conflict of the European powers less offensive to the ruling group, but I would just like to put that on the record, that it may have ended up in a very serious carnage of ethnic groups, but it started because of some thugs who just wanted to retain power, creating the problem.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me play through here, if I may, Mr. Ambassador. Since I have a quorum, I have to take advantage of it. It will be hopefully a short period.

[Break for markup.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Moose, as I said in my statement on the bill, probably the most critical task facing many of the African countries is demobilization. Can you tell me what country is in most need today of demobilization, again hitting you cold?

Mr. MOOSE. We have a lengthy list of countries which for a variety of reasons have wound up with military establishments which far exceed either their requirements or their capacity to pay for them. I would put at the top of that list Ethiopia and Eritrea, emerging from lengthy civil wars, as a result of which they now have substantial military establishments.

I would certainly include in that list Mozambique, but would note here that within the context of the United Nations peace settlement there is a program for demobilization. So that that aspect is being dealt with. Should an agreement be reached in Angola, we would hope, that there will be a similar plan that would allow for a necessary demobilization of troops?

Similarly, as we have talked about Liberia, the whole Liberian peace settlement is also based on a program of disarmament and demobilization. This is an essential element, I think, in trying to assure future stability. I think those would probably head my list.

I would simply add that the new South African Government has indicated that it faces a problem as well, both in terms of integrating the various elements of the security forces into a new South African national defense force, and in making sure that that new force is rightly sized for its new mission and for the capacity of the budget to support it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. What has been one of our successes—can you name any successful cases of demobilization in Africa?

Mr. MOOSE. The one that comes most immediately to mind is Uganda. One of the things we need to keep in mind is that there are a number of organizations and agencies which can assist in demobilization. In the case of Uganda, the World Bank greatly assisted demobilization for economic reasons. That economic objective was to take this pool of able-bodied Ugandans and transform them into a new economic asset by giving them skills that would enable them to enter the civilian economy. So there is a marriage here both in terms of our economic development objectives and our security and military objectives, and a marriage, as well, in the kinds of organizations and institutions which can cooperate in bringing their respective resources to bear in carrying out these programs.

So I guess I would say that even a smaller modest contribution on the part of the United States is not inconsequential when it is

put together with contributions that we fully expect will be forthcoming in other institutions.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. I really don't have any questions. I just agree that the whole question of demobilization is so important. When we visited Uganda we saw troops waiting near the airport where they were living, not a regular airport, but where we landed, waiting to be reintegrated into society, and we are seeing the problem. We visited Mozambique where the reception centers were there, but the funding was lacking and it lagged because there was not—the funds were not available to live up to the promises that the Rome agreement made, and therefore slowed down to some degree the whole demobilization.

But I do agree, and in Eritrea also where there has been civil war for 20 or 30 years, it has a tremendous size military, a country that really has a lot of potential, because it seems like it is determined to succeed, but with that large military and the lack of funds to demobilize, I couldn't think of any resources that could be any better spent at the present time than to deal with the question of conflict resolution, but also indeed the whole question of demobilization.

When you take a person's gun you have to give them something, some land or a tool or give them training or give them a job, or there is no incentive to give up the rifle. I think that we—I think it is key to the success of the whole future in sub-Saharan Africa.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Hastings.

Mr. BURTON. Could I ask—

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am sorry. I thought you didn't want to ask him any questions?

Mr. BURTON. I didn't say that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You said you agree that he is a nice guy, but you knew what his position was. Go ahead.

Mr. BURTON. Secretary Moose, you said that Uganda was an example where you thought that demobilization had been effective and then you alluded to the fact that the World Bank put economic pressure on Uganda and that had a lot to do with it.

Mr. MOOSE. I meant not so much the economic pressure, but actually the World Bank contributed to the retraining of demobilizing troops.

Mr. BURTON. But that had probably more to do with the effort than almost anything else?

Mr. MOOSE. Certainly the—well, there were several things. Number one, the government itself recognized that it wished to demobilize these troops. Number two, there was a need in that process for some outside assistance. Much of that assistance in this case came from the World Bank. Others participated as well, as I recall UNDP. Both were, I think, important factors here. The government wished to demobilize but needed outside assistance.

Mr. BURTON. There are 13 countries in Africa, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa and Zaire—they total 451,650. These are the areas where conflict or potential conflict is very real.

Is there any projected schedule on how much these countries plan to demobilize or is there any discussion on how many troops they are planning to cut back and if so, how many?

Mr. MOOSE. There are, in some cases, as I referred to the cases of Mozambique and Angola earlier. Demobilization and downsizing have been main features of the peace negotiations in those countries. Likewise, in the case of Liberia, these have been an integral parts of the negotiation process.

With respect to some of the other countries that you mentioned, to the best of my knowledge there is no firm understanding or agreement on military downsizing.

Mr. BURTON. One last question, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned Angola, Mozambique and—

Mr. MOOSE. Liberia.

Mr. BURTON. In all three of those cases, there were bloody, bloody—I remember the bodies lying and rotting in the streets, and in Angola the same thing and in Mozambique the same thing. In all three of those cases there were horrible wars that went on for a long period of time. And then, finally, the participants decided they had better start negotiating because if they didn't it was never going to end, because there was no end in sight.

And that kind of makes my point. In those particular cases you mentioned, our taxpayers' dollars, our money, did not bring those people to the conference table. The thing that brought them to the conference table was us sending our State Department people over to Rome and elsewhere to get them to sit down and talk. But our taxpayers' dollars didn't resolve those conflicts and didn't cause them to demobilize. It was simply they wore each other out and then, finally, were willing to sit down and talk, and we mediated those talks or started mediating them.

I would like for you to respond to that. Because putting money into those things until they are ready to get them to sit down and negotiate is not going to solve the problem.

Mr. MOOSE. I think I would respond by saying that the recognition of the importance of demobilization and the threat posed by oversized, underutilized military establishments is, from a U.S. policy point of view, a fairly recent development.

And I think what the international community has learned from the experiences over the last several years, and why demobilization now figures so prominently in the discussions in Mozambique and Angola and elsewhere, is recognition that the military establishments were made too large by conflict and also recognition on the part of the parties themselves that if something is not done now to downsize those establishments, those establishments will represent a threat to the future stability and the democratization process that has taken place.

And that, in every case, where we have talked about this, it has been understood that some commitment of resources is essential if we are going to carry out that objective, whether it is U.S. resources, World Bank resources or U.N. resources.

That somehow or another, in order to prevent a recurrence of the kind of violence that we have just seen in places like Mozambique and Angola, that there needs to be some considered program to

provide an alternative to those people who have been agents of that violence.

And I think as we have looked at that part of the process in places like Angola and Mozambique, it has made us more conscious of the fact that in other countries as well around the continent—for example, in Mali. In Mali, we have faced a very similar situation where there is a military establishment that is much too large for the government to continue to support. And if they can't pay that military establishment, they very much risk becoming a source of instability. So it has obliged us to focus on this, both from a security point of view and also from a development point of view.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Burton, just one observation, and that is that the bill really is not setting up a mechanism within the State Department for these conflicts or demobilization. It is setting up a mechanism within Africa and the African organizations whether it is the OAU or subregional.

I have heard you correctly say several times that Africans have to resolve African matters, and I think this is our shot to do that.

Judge Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we left the subject of Rwanda somewhere in the midst of our activities. Is it permissible that I should go forward in that regard?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Oh, please do. Yes.

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. Mr. Secretary, knowing your extraordinary experience in this arena and my lack thereof, I would appreciate you telling me what you know the definition of genocide to be under the aegis of the United Nations.

Mr. MOOSE. I am not the expert on this, Congressman Hastings. I think the definition is set out in the U.N. Charter and in U.N. resolution. It is certainly figured in the definitions as applied by the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

The resolution that was adopted just 3 weeks ago now by the special session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission made reference to the belief in many quarters that acts of genocide have been committed in Rwanda, and it called upon the rapporteur, who is approved by that resolution, to investigate those charges. I think that is as far as I can go in giving you a response to that specific question.

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, you see, the rapporteur then ought to travel with CNN. Because if what I saw on television last night, those bodies in the Catholic church are hanged in the manner that they were and the number of children dismembered and other individuals with serious injuries, not to mention the number of thrown bodies throughout Rwanda, if that ain't genocide, grits ain't groceries. And I am genuinely concerned that we can't bring ourselves to say that it is genocide. And if it is, then it would seem to me that we have some exacting responsibilities that either were or are being ignored.

And I am concerned to know as a policymaker, you know, what my responsibilities are. It is numbing to see this take place and for us not to do one damn thing. And I am at a loss—not your house, but maybe Madeleine Albright's or maybe President Clinton or

maybe Boutros Boutros-Ghali or maybe the Organization of African Unity—but some damn where somebody has some greater responsibility for the maintenance of world peace than we have been able to accomplish. And I offer that out of frustration, recognizing that it is not necessarily your responsibility.

But if what took place in Rwanda is not genocide and if President Clinton can stand in front of the Holocaust Memorial and say that there will never be another holocaust—and I agree that there should not be and that there have been—and if in Rwanda a holocaust has not taken place, then when are we going to recognize that a holocaust is taking place as we speak? And if it is not Rwanda, as Dan Burton has so aptly put it, it is likely to be other places. At another point in time Angola, Burundi, Zaire are all waiting to explode.

And if we can't somehow or another come up with a mechanism—and that is why I support this particular legislative offering of the chairman. If we can't come up with some kind of mechanism that is going to give us a means to support peace in Africa, then probably we ought to pull out. And we sure ought to pull out of NATO and OAS and we shouldn't do anything in the Pacific Rim because the possibilities exist there, what with the economic thrust that is involved in those areas, that we will be in worse shape.

And perhaps—again, Mr. Ambassador, I don't need your response, but it is awfully frustrating to see this happening and us not doing anything.

Mr. MOOSE. If I might respond, at least in part, and simply to say that the United States was as responsible as anybody for the effort to get a special session of the Human Rights Commission to deal with this issue, and that was a result of the initiative taken by my colleague, John Shattuck, who visited the region shortly after the crisis began and who met with the new Human Rights Commissioner, Ambassador Ahala Yauso, and on that basis reached an agreement that an urgent meeting of the Human Rights Commission was in fact called for precisely to investigate the issues that you have raised.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

I know where you are going, because I want to know—haven't we been standing in the way of even the African persons who wanted to go in and assist with troops?

Mr. MOOSE. That would not be an accurate characterization of our effort. I would say to you that no country has been more active in trying to work with the U.N. to come up with a concept of operations for this that made sense and would work. And, as we have seen, there are a number of issues that arose.

The first was the threat posed directly to the troops who were trying to stay there and maintain the peace. And, frankly, I find it very difficult to say to the other governments who have troops there that they ought to keep their troops there in harm's way and that the lives of people from their country is a lower value than that of lives of the people of Rwanda themselves.

We have urged the U.N. and others to focus on the issue of how to extend protection to the people who are most at risk. I think that that is the objective with which the U.N. is now seized. We have offered our full cooperation to them in doing that. That in-

cludes logistical support and airlift and anything else that we can do to facilitate the deployment of troops or of personnel that would enable the U.N. to carry out that mission.

I am hopeful that we will have within today or tomorrow the further resolution or elaboration and authorization that allows the U.N. to go forward.

Mr. HASTINGS. You know something, Mr. Secretary? More people have died in 5 weeks in Rwanda than died in Bosnia, and I think that we have been ineffective in Bosnia as well. I suspect that if something like this were taking place in England or France that the whole world would stop and attend to it that day. And I don't understand why the dillydallying.

And, understand, I am not accusing you. I am talking about all of us in the world. Why, you know, as we speak, more people are being killed. Obviously, the killers feel that they can get away with it because nobody is doing anything. And by the time we get ready to do something there is nothing left to be done because every damn body is dead. I mean, you know, it is mind boggling.

Mr. Chairman, let me yield if I have any time to Mr. Payne who do have a more serious question. I am just frustrated.

Mr. PAYNE. No. I think you are right on track.

You know, there is conflicting reports. There is an article, I am not sure if you saw it or not, on Friday, June 3, that was in the Post, which outlines in lengthy form a number of the situations that quoted that the United States—in addition to the demands that a cease-fire be on hand before the dispatch of troops, the United States is making matters worse by insisting that any U.N. troops work from the outside to protect Rwanda's fighting in the camps in the border areas.

There is a point actually before that that goes on to talk about the reluctance of the United States to encourage African troops to become engaged under combat engagements, but it is a Friday, June 3, article. But, also, the fact that we have not declared it officially as genocide because that triggers in responsibility of the world.

At a meeting in Geneva just several days ago, I guess, or a week ago, Ambassador Geraldine Ferraro described the slaughter as genocide. She was representing the United States. The Pope also called it genocide. And, of course, Boutros Boutros-Ghali has also considered it genocide. But there is no official action on the part of the United Nations.

Also, I do recall that it was with the—when the 5,500 peacekeepers were there at the border that it was brought to my attention that the United States encouraged, first, getting out our people, which was right, but then that the 5,500 peacekeepers be removed and that 270 were left in. And the fact that a plan was asked for by—I saw about a 15-minute interview with Mrs. Albright asking that—this was several weeks ago—that we take 3 or 4 weeks to come up with a plan in Rwanda and this, of course, was 2 months after the killing began.

So there has been a feeling on the part of many of us, as a matter of fact to the point where I was almost at the point of requesting that Mrs. Albright resign as the U.N. Ambassador to the United Nations.

I have been very troubled by, really, by the lack of concern—not on your part. I am talking about up in New York at the United Nations. And I think that we are going to really look more carefully at this problem because I do get different stories coming out of different sections of our State Department policy or lack of it.

Mr. MOOSE. If I might.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. You didn't want to hang there like a frozen clothesline, did you?

Mr. MOOSE. If I might just try to respond briefly to some of the specific points that the Congressman raised.

First, on the question of the cease-fire, we have not insisted that there be a cease-fire. We have asked the U.N. to consider what could be done in the absence of a cease-fire. But I think we all agree that it is far more likely that we will have a successful operation if at least, we the parties, agree that we conduct operations. That is what we have been seeking.

Secondly, on this question of operating out of Kigali versus operating from the outside in. Yes, we have urged the U.N. to consider alternatives to operating out of Kigali. The reasons are very practical ones. We have seen over the last 4 or 5 weeks that one of the things that has stymied the U.S. efforts to carry out its proposed plan, has been the fighting in and around Kigali. Particularly disturbing are the attacks on the airport which have made it almost impossible to assure any secure resupply access through Kigali. It is precisely for that reason that we have been urging from the very outset that the U.N. consider other options.

It is also because most of the people at risk are not in Kigali. They are behind the lines one way or the other. And it is for that reason, again, that we have urged some sort of other operations.

And, in fact, the Secretary General's report from last week and the new resolution, is based on that concept, that is that the objective should be, in the first instance, to try to extend security to those people wherever they are, including from across the borders rather than out of Kigali, if necessary.

Third, on the question of discouraging African troops, we have strongly urged and encouraged, both in direct conversations and in messages that we have sent around the world, Africans to contribute.

But I will simply say one of the issues that African troop contributors ask, just as we would, is to what kind of an operation are they contributing? What are the terms of the operation? Under what conditions would their forces be asked to go in? Are conditions permissive or would they have to go into a hostile environment? All of those questions which are relevant for us are relevant for them.

And, finally, on the question of withdrawal of the troops, the same question applied in the original force. There were—first and foremost, those troops were sent there under a totally different premise. They were sent there to enforce a cease-fire or to observe and monitor a cease-fire. And when that situation broke down and when those elements found themselves the objects of the targets of violence, those two contributing nations quite rightly asked whether they were obliged in these circumstances to keep their troops there. And, frankly, we did not feel that we were in a position to

say to them that you must keep your troops there under those circumstances.

So, yes, we did support their request that they withdraw those troops. We also supported the U.N. Secretary General's recommendation and the recommendation of his general in the field when he felt that the conditions were right that he could keep 270 people there, and we supported him in that request. We also supported the request that they increase that number in the last Security Council resolution.

Again, as I said earlier, we share the frustration that members of the committee feel about the difficulty of putting a plan in place that is going to make a meaningful response to the people whose lives are at risk. I think there are questions that need to be addressed and asked about the whole U.N. procedure and the ways in which our own government and other governments respond to that. But I would simply assert, again, that I think we have been more active than any other member in the U.N. in trying to work with the U.N. to come up with a workable plan.

Mr. PAYNE. I really will only take a second.

But Ms. Albricht in her interview indicated she was unsure of the cost, and that had to be a very strong factor because we pay 30 percent of the peacekeeping. This is how several hundred thousand people have died. I know we have to be cognizant of cost. But that was one of the main items that was brought up in her interview 2 weeks ago.

The other thing was no one was really asking for U.N. troops to engage themselves in the conflict between the Rwanda Patriotic Front or RPF and the original elite group of Hutu Palace Guard. And, as it spread, no one was saying to get involved in the conflict between the two warring armies. We are just simply saying to simply have a protective corridor as we have in Iraq for Kurds to have a buffer as we had on the border of Uganda and Rwanda for a long period of time, to have a buffer around—let the fighters fight then if that has to be, unfortunately, but just to save the women and the children.

That is all we were asking, not to get engaged in the war.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Before I let you go, one last yes or no answer. And that is, does the administration feel that the carnage in Rwanda meets the definition of genocide?

Mr. MOOSE. Mr. Chairman, I will stick by the statement that we made in the Human Rights Commission, that we believe that acts of genocide have occurred, and our instruction to the rapporteur to investigate those allegations.

Mr. JOHNSTON. To answer your question, Judge, I got interested in the word genocide back during Idi Amin when the United Nations did nothing and the OAU did nothing. And I looked it up, and there is no definition in the United Nations Charter. But the definition in my Oxford dictionary that runs 3,000 pages is when any ethnic group is slaughtered up to 10 percent, that meets it.

And I think Alison DesForges tried to convince the United Nations and us that day that the deaths in Rwanda far exceed 10 percent of the Tutsi population.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. You have been very, very helpful today.



Our next witness is James Woods.

Mr. Woods, before you start, I had placed you in the Department of State when I first read my opening statement, and I am not sure if you want to sue or—

Mr. WOODS. I am going to sue you, yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is right. But just go right on in.

Before you start on your prepared testimony, Mr. Woods, I want to say that your experience in Africa—I did some mathematics, as I do often when it comes to per capita—and your experience in Africa is 15 times greater than mine. And in the last year you have been an incredible asset to me, to the community and to the committee. And I personally will miss you and hope that we can call upon you as we have done today to come back and give us your perception and perspective of what is going on on this continent.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And, with that, I ask you to give your opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES WOODS, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Mr. WOODS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the kind words.

Today, I am testifying in my new capacity as a private citizen, since I retired last week from the Department of Defense after 34 years, the last 16 of which I have been working on African affairs. So it will be refreshingly different today to speak without some of the weight of official positions and clearances.

That said, my statement will be brief, because I did have a chance to review the statement of Assistant Secretary Moose—or to look at it last night. It changed slightly this morning, I see. But the substance of it and, in fact, the details of it—I was very much in agreement, and I feel that to some extent I can simply build upon and reinforce the comments that Secretary Moose made.

I am enthusiastically in support, in principle and in specifics, of the subcommittee's proposed African Conflict Resolution Act. I find it appropriate, timely and affordable, and I hope that all concerned with its consideration will give it effective support and passage.

I would like to note that I have been an advocate of this type of assistance to the OAU and to other African organizations for several years.

In 1992, then Assistant Secretary of State Hank Cohen and I worked together—made an agreement, and we worked together for some months, to get what is called a Presidential Determination which would make the OAU permanently eligible to receive U.S. military assistance, the intent being particularly assistance in peacekeeping support. And that so-called PD was, in fact, signed by then-President Bush as fiscal year 1992 came to a close, and we were immediately able to begin modest funding to the OAU for conflict resolution.

Ambassador Cohen would have liked to be here today, but he is in Paris. I did call him up, and we talked on Monday. He said he had reviewed this legislation in draft very carefully. He asked me to state for the record that he very strongly endorses it, and he, too, hopes that it will come to pass.

Let me highlight a few points.

First, while administration official witnesses are enjoined from endorsing any particular congressionally proposed fiscal targets, I am no longer encumbered by that restraint. I think the numbers in your bill have been carefully considered. I think they are appropriate for the intended purposes. I think and I hope that they will be retained.

Secondly, and here I am sure that my colleagues in the executive branch would part company, my ex-colleagues, I would hope that in order to ensure that the administration continues to move smartly along the track defined by this legislation, if it passes, I would suggest that you mandate, perhaps off-line rather than in the legislation itself, occasional reports.

I think the Department of State should submit them on behalf of the interagency, because this must be an interagency effort—State, AID, DOD at least—and the report should cover progress made and, of course, problems and obstacles which are being encountered. I think such brief reports to the subcommittee, I think perhaps every six months, would be useful to you and also useful to the executive branch in getting its interagency processes organized and moving forward.

I do have a few cautions as we proceed down this road.

First, what you are asking to be done will not be easy, and it will at best be done slowly and uncertainly. The necessity to work over many years is recognized in the legislation, and I hope that this is kept in mind as we go along, and that patience and persistence all around are understood to be essential. Also, occasional acceptance of setback and failure will be necessary.

Secondly, it will be necessary for all of us to keep firmly in mind that we are proposing to support—I underline support—an initiative taken originally by the OAU itself and more recent initiatives taken by African subregional organizations themselves. We are not proposing to take over those initiatives. We are not proposing to provide an American approach and American solutions. I think we can indeed help the Africans in many different ways, but we must be sensitive that they and their institutions are always in the lead, and we are in support.

In a similar vein, there are other important potential contributors to this endeavor. I am sorry Mr. Burton isn't here, because, in part, this might address his comment, which is correct, that this effort in and of itself is not adequately funded to do the job; but we are not trying to do the job alone. There are other potential contributors. The U.N. and its specialized organs may assist financially or technically. Many other countries—hopefully, many other countries—will choose to contribute on a bilateral basis, and private and voluntary organizations may contribute expertise or funding.

So we should pursue this initiative in a collaborative and open way and seek to build a strong and coherent community of concerned actors and concerned contributors.

This effort, and our contributions to it, need to be practical. I want to be careful not to be misunderstood on this next point. I am looking for balance between the academic on the one hand and the practical and applied on the other, and I think that is what you

are seeking. Research has its place, conferences and consultations have their place, but this effort needs to go far beyond academic and diplomatic discourse.

OAU Secretary General Salim Salim launched his initiative formally in June of 1992 with, I think, a very keen understanding of the need to go well beyond the traditional OAU consultative approach. In spending the monies appropriated by the Congress to support the OAU to date and in looking at the specifics of the approaches which you have recommended in the African Conflict Resolution Act, I am impressed by the attempt to be practical, to be applied, to be relevant to real situations.

As we extend the proposed training and technical assistance and materiel and financial assistance, I hope the balance will remain firmly tilted to building practical capabilities that can be applied without delay to real crises.

Now, certainly, some of these enhanced capabilities we are looking for will be intangibles such as improved collection, synthesis and transmission of information bearing on actual or potential problems. This is sometimes called intelligence; but whether intelligence or information, certainly it is intangible, and it is essential—heightened and more sophisticated understanding of the causes of conflict and approaches that might head them off, or collegial exchanges of senior personnel who might in the future need to work together in addressing a crisis, getting to know one another and learning to work together.

All of this kind of activity is useful, and we should support it. That is appropriate.

But equally critical is building the assets that need to be ready to address crises as they build and as they flare up, without delay. Such things as well-schooled and trained headquarters staff to lead the technical effort and to develop operational plans; properly trained and equipped, predesignated combat and support units around Africa, ready to go on relatively short notice; and modest stocks of items particularly useful for observing, monitoring and peacekeeping missions. As examples, I could cite binoculars, long-distance communications, tactical secure communications, global positioning systems, field rations, field health and medical supplies, and good maps.

If this process is successful, 4 or 5 years from now all of these things will be in place, and the participating African organizations will have successfully built the bridge from the conceptual and academic to the practical and the applied. The interaction of these very different communities cannot but be most helpful to the improvement of both.

A point of possible concern is noted in Secretary Moose's statement where he talks about assistance to subregional organizations. The wording appears to reflect some concern at perhaps a potential dilution of our support effort, perhaps a confusion over roles or competition for supportive resources rather than helpful, complementary efforts.

I talked a few days ago to Ambassador Irv Hicks, who will soon be going out to Ethiopia. And, of course, he will be playing a key role in this process, and he expressed some similar concerns.

My hope is that we would not be too doctrinaire on this aspect. I expect there will be occasions where it is evident that the OAU itself should be squarely in the lead; but other occasions where the local subregional organization might better be in the lead, including the possibility that the OAU would have been politically divided and unable to act on a particular issue or it might have itself arrived at a preference in a particular case for local remedies first.

I agree completely with Ambassador Moose's statement that regional mediation and conflict resolution efforts should be undertaken in a closely coordinated way. Let us not, however, in advance, prejudge that our support to conflict resolution and peacekeeping needs to be filtered through the OAU in all cases nor necessarily be formally coordinated with the OAU in all cases.

Let us be pragmatic and see what develops and work directly in support of these subregional organizations as well, as opportunities arise, with the expectation of helping them build logical and mutually supporting ties with the OAU.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I will be happy to try to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Woods, you were good under restraints. You are fantastic now that you have been cut loose.

You stated something here about how I have always questioned our infallibility, and that is lodging conflict resolution heavily in the OAU.

I guess I was—when Congressman Payne, Congressman Hastings, and I were in Kenya last year, some of the parliamentarians there came up and said, you are putting it in the wrong place. You know, you should have an independent pan-African group to do it because of the history of the OAU. The OAU, under its charter, you know, has certain prohibitions about going into sovereign countries. And so you make an incredible statement here. I have to read it again.

Properly trained and equipped, predesignated combat and support units around Africa ready to go on relatively short notice, modest stocks of items particularly useful for observing, monitoring and peacekeeping. Combat troops. Now, would this be all-African under the OAU? And my question is, can they do such a thing under their present charter, and, if so, where were they in Rwanda?

Mr. WOODS. There are a number of African countries which, in fact, have these types of units, particularly the combat units which I would say is basically the infantry battalion or infantry brigade which, with a little help, could be maintained in a status ready to go on short notice. I don't mean 48 hours, but let's say in a week or two. They might need and probably would need strategic lift if they were not in an adjacent country.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Which would be about the only thing we would volunteer.

Mr. WOODS. Which we could volunteer if we wanted to or would nowadays. I mean, who pays for the operation?

And the legislation you propose does not cover the cost of operations. That is another case where Mr. Burton is quite correct. If you are actually looking at any type of major operation, just—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me interrupt you here. The U.N. has pledged \$3 million out of their pocket toward this.

Mr. WOODS. Well, that would help for—

Mr. JOHNSTON. For a half an hour.

Mr. WOODS. That would help for a half-hour in Somalia. It might fund entirely a very useful monitoring operation which would prevent a war in some other country.

I don't—I think my approach on this legislation, this is not a panacea. And we are not going to solve the conflicts in Africa because of this legislation. This is a contribution, and it is an attempt to address some of the root causes, and it would address them by creating capabilities in Africa with outside help to better understand those root causes and to try to take preemptive action, if you will, conflict resolution in the earliest stages, calling attention to them, consultation, technical intervention, but also to have forces ready to go for monitoring missions.

When the first people were sent into Rwanda they needed the most basic equipment. They needed transportation. They needed radios and so on. We were able to help a little bit. It took us longer than it should have, but that at least was a start.

Now there is no reason that very limited stocks of equipment, so that you can send monitoring teams in a few days rather than 2 or 3 months, you know, can't be on the shelf.

As for sending the combat troops, several African countries have volunteered to maintain standing forces ready for international peacekeeping. A number of these countries—Senegal is a very good example—have engaged extensively and very professionally in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping. Senegal engaged in Liberia with considerable distinction—of course, also with major U.S. financial and materiel support.

Zimbabwe has excellent troops. South Africa, of course, is already being—some people are attempting to lure them into this type of a role, and certainly their troops are very professional. Ethiopia has very professional troops.

So I have suggested to some of my colleagues, African and U.S. diplomats, that you have to set a reasonable target. Maybe 5 years out we are talking about having a standby force of 5,000 or 10,000; you know, so many brigades ready to go within 30 days, some reasonably sensible target and work toward it.

Now, we shouldn't have to equip these folks from the socks up. I mean, the countries we are talking about have effective troops. They will need some help. But, you know, they have the basic equipment. They are going to need financial support. They are going to need expendables if they go to the field. And, frankly, they also want—and this always becomes a problem—per diem.

Of course, when the U.N. puts soldiers into the field the country—not the soldier, the country—gets 900-some dollars a month for every infantryman and about \$1,200 a month for each technician. And, of course, sometimes the soldiers get some of this back.

When the OAU or regional organization authorizes—they won't I think themselves necessarily always be, "sending and command-

ing"—there is no such agreed source and level of per diem. You know, I think you have to be fairly flexible as to what each particular operation might look like, because they tend to be very dissimilar, and there might be a mixture.

In the case of Liberia, you have, you know, an ECOMOG initiative and you also have an OAU initiative mixed up. You have the same thing, a mixture, in Rwanda of different components with different nations.

But a lot of the things which, I would say, confused the United States over the past year, with command lines and authorities and who is running which aspect of the show, the Africans themselves will also have to sort out, and perhaps they can build on our confusion.

Let me stop there.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Just to say that I really concur with much of what you said, and I guess it is something about being released from the—from your fiscal responsibilities. Even you wouldn't believe it. Hank Cohen and I now agree more than what I do with our U.N. Ambassador from this side of the aisle.

But I have also sort of suggested that there could possibly—and it wasn't just for Africa, but just have a standing U.N. army, something similar to what we are talking about here, through the OAU or the regional organizations. And it would—I think it certainly would have avoided a lot of the—of course, it is difficult to do, but many people today almost make it mandatory that no soldier gets injured. I mean, we don't ever want people to get hurt, but when you are in the military, you get hurt sometimes, especially if you are in conflict.

But we are seeing a move and a mood in this country where there is reluctance to feel that we should put any of our military men in harm's way unless it is just the last-ditch effort where perhaps our national security is being challenged. So with that growing feeling it would appear to me that there has to then be some other way to have peacekeepers where we in the past might have been involved but will find less and less.

And perhaps this not only in Africa but in other parts where there is trouble or potential trouble that some sort of a standing army, sort of like the old French Foreign Legion type of thing, would be under the U.N.'s guidance. And in that way it wouldn't—there would not be a reluctance, for example, to, say, go militarily into Haiti, if that was necessary, if you had an army that was not identified directly with any nation, sort of a multinational.

What do you think about that on a larger scale? Since we are finding the reluctance—although I am very encouraged by the fact that 14 countries did say that they would consider going into Rwanda. That is very encouraging.

But what do you think of even a more generalized situation to prevent what happened, for example, in Somalia when the politicians—primarily, you know, the Congress people—said we got to, you know, cut and run, get out, turn the Harlan County ship around trying to dock in Port-au-Prince, because there are a couple of dozen folks on the Bay with some handguns. Their needs would then perhaps be with some other force.

Because I just don't think we could allow hoodlums to run the world, and that is what it would boil down to if there would be no threat of, say, a policeman, so to speak. And the United States certainly can't be the world's policeman, in my opinion.

Mr. WOODS. I think I agree with the track you are on in principle. I think it is going to take us quite a while to get there, especially since we have been traumatized by Somalia, and that has been reflected in our subsequent actions and indeed is reflected, I think, in the delays which we are encountering in dealing with Rwanda.

But let's go back to Africa. We are not talking about creating a new standing army nor one that would be, "under the command of the OAU." I don't think we are. But I am talking about taking units which exist in standing African armies now and many of these countries have already—are making offers. And, in fact, they are identifying things that they would like to get to bring the units fully up to standard. I have a list from a couple of countries already. So it is predesignating units.

Now, that doesn't necessarily mean when the crisis arrives that you are going to get a consensus at the OAU and the collective political will to actually deal with it, you know, and have a vote, yes, to dispatch such a force, nor that the terms of reference will be preagreed. There is a lot to be worked out when a particular crisis arrives.

But if the units are ready to go, if there is a headquarters staff which is competent to plan, guide and direct such an effort, you can compress months or a year into, I would think, a few weeks, and that could be absolutely critical.

It does not solve the problem of the will to intervene. And if the OAU could be paralyzed by the country saying that is an internal matter and it will kill off a particular batch of people but that is none of your business. Or this is not genocide; this is merely an internal civil war and you have no right to intervene, which is the Sudanese position. If they cannot overcome that, then they will be paralyzed.

In which case I think that there are many other alternative ways of dealing with the situation potentially: Bilateral coalition, U.N., the neighbors informally or formally through the regional organization. There are a whole variety of ways of going about this.

One of the advantages of encouraging the Africans to do it is exactly the point you made. If we want to be a world leader but we don't want to commit our own troops in all of these emergencies, then, for heaven's sakes, let's encourage others to be better prepared, especially when they tell us that they would like to do this and take the lead for themselves and deal with their own problems. Let's give them a hand.

I think my argument, I guess, with Mr. Burton—I am again sorry he is not here—is that, yes, there are some costs here, but the costs of not doing it are far higher. Because you have either the humanitarian costs, which are many times the amounts we are talking about, of an actual crisis, an actual disaster, millions of displaced people and refugees which come out of African conflicts, or you will have the direct cost of intervention. Whether we are bear-

ing it directly or through the U.N. with our 30 percent plus, those will be enormous costs of failure.

So to the extent that we can succeed from time to time with an initiative of this kind—and I say of this kind because I think there need to be similar initiatives where we will continue to work and to strengthen the U.N. And in some cases, frankly, we should be prepared to move bilaterally or with our friends.

In retrospect, I suppose if we and the Belgians and French had a meeting of the minds on Rwanda, we might have worked more effectively together early on to prevent what has happened. But, of course, that is hindsight, and perhaps it wouldn't have been possible because we come at it from very different perspectives.

But this is not—again, I am very enthusiastic about this initiative. I hope it succeeds. But, you know, it is another tool in the diplomat's kit, or armory. It is not a panacea.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I agree, too, that in probably Zaire if the Government of France would have moved when that last crisis began, we might have been able to install a reflective government of the people as that country now continues to sink deeper and deeper into chaos and starvation and illness and so forth.

There was, I think, an opportunity if the will was there when the French and the Belgians were there in the country. But the will wasn't there. I think Mr. Mobutu should—has a prior government and should be eliminated from government, and that was an opportunity I think that was lost at that time.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always appreciate hearing Mr. Woods. He made me feel better today. It was a very affirmative statement and a very thoughtful statement.

I am constantly amazed, after being here more than 30 years in Congress, although a new member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that we have progressed so far insofar as the internationalization of the problems that we are talking about today.

When I ran in 1962, even supporting the U.N. verbally was a very controversial thing to do. There were all sorts of accusations of world government, the loss of sovereignty and what are you going to do when the U.N. takes over the world, those were the kind of accusations that were made against those of us who supported the U.N. To a great extent that is gone, and the evolution is really something wonderful to see, even though it takes time. Of course, it takes time. The process always takes time. But you have to have process in place before you are going to be able to do anything.

I think the United States has learned and other countries have learned that you can do things immediately; you can invade Mexico like we did many years ago or try to solve the problems of Nicaragua or any number of places, Haiti, for example, and it doesn't necessarily solve the problem at all. You have to have a good process in place.

This process as outlined in the chairman's bill is certainly a valuable weapon. It is not going to solve the problem, but it is certainly going to make a contribution in the ultimate resolution of the prob-



lem, and I think that is the way that Mr. Woods feels, and I compliment him on it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOODS. I would like to say a word in this vein about the demobilization aspect. And, again, I am very positive on the support to demobilization. I think it needs to be approached on a very careful and case-by-case basis. But there is a good bit to be said.

If we can, where appropriate, downsize these armies, you are saving the costs on the government budget. You are getting—you will get—if you go at it correctly, you will get a better utilization of foreign aid resources. It will be an improvement in political stability, and it will contribute to development. So this is addressing an attempt to address in one significant way—demobilization—one of the root causes of, I think, political and economic problems which contribute ultimately to conflict.

So we are talking about root causes. I think this part, the demobilization, is an attempt to get at one of the specific causes of disorder in Africa, which is—not in all countries but in many countries—excessively large militaries which you can't afford to keep and you can't afford to throw into the streets. So you are sort of trapped. With help from the international community, I think they can get over that—certain countries can get over that problem, and that will help them politically and will help them economically and will provide the stability in which they can hopefully start to move forward.

The Africans themselves have recognized this. There was a conference several years ago in Kampala, and I keep referring back to what was called the Kampala Document which proposes an unparalleled approach for providing security, stability, et cetera all at the same time. And if you neglect any of those, then the whole process will be in turmoil.

Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You made an interesting comment about the fact that in rebuttal to Mr. Burton if we don't do this the costs are so much higher. We are trying to authorize roughly \$25 million. Somalia cost us \$1.5 billion, and that is 60 times greater than what we are trying to do in this conflict resolution bill.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, the budget of the United States for atomic weapons this year is \$21 billion. That is new ones, maintenance and cleanup.

Mr. JOHNSTON. \$21 million.

Mr. EDWARDS. \$1 billion.

Mr. WOODS. On the other hand, I think we have to respond to—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Here is the DOD coming back. He can't get away from—

Mr. WOODS. No, no, I won't deal with that one. That is Department of Energy.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am just kidding, Mr. Woods.

Mr. WOODS. I know. But I think we have to respond to Congressman Burton's challenge. If we are going to spend the money, then let's give the best possible assurance that it will be well spent and have the best impact.

As this thing gets going it is going to need the attention of the committee and from the committee staff, and it is going to need the kind of attention in the interagency which sometimes, frankly, you don't get, because we get wrapped up in immediate problems, and we don't look at the implications of how we are spending money to build institutions and change ways of thinking.

So this one had better be very, very carefully watched or some of Mr. Burton's concerns may be realized. So let's—you know, let's make sure it is as applied, practical and useful as possible.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I think that your idea is very good, and between now and full committee we might ask you to help us possibly write in oversight provisions in the bill. Because, as you say, it is——

Mr. EDWARDS. Good idea.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. It is several agencies, and——

Mr. WOODS. I used to hate that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I was about to say, the State Department is going to love you for this.

Mr. WOODS. But it can be kept simple. One doesn't need to do the kinds of things that some of the appropriations committees do.

Mr. JOHNSTON. No. We are very simple.

Let me go back. Is the \$25 million sufficient as a start?

Mr. WOODS. Probably not. But I think it is a good—it is a serious sum. It would be a good test. It will enable us to work several cases seriously and see how it goes. You may want to adjust it six months from now, 12 months from now.

And I think one of the things that concerns me—of course, the money that—you know, the agencies get money with a time limit, and then when they draw close to the time, they haven't spent it, they tend to spend it badly. So I hope we can resist that tendency, also. Sometimes it can be rolled over, but then you run into all sorts of complications here on the Hill as to how that process works. I don't pretend to understand your budgetary restrictions and procedures.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We can't explain them either.

Mr. WOODS. No. Is this for the most part 1-year money?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Some of it is over 4 additional years.

Mr. WOODS. OK. Well——

Mr. JOHNSTON. But that is a small amount.

Mr. WOODS. This kind of effort, it shouldn't—I hope it doesn't get subject to: We have to spend the money now just because September 30 is rolling around, that kind of problem.

I would be happy to work with you, and I think it is a matter of dialogue and consultation. I think the Department of State, after they cool off, will be very happy to have that kind of dialogue. I just think they should formalize it in a report that a lot of people can look at and read, and if people have criticism, let them see what is going on and criticize it on that basis. Otherwise, it will tend to drift off, I am afraid, and you know a year from now we will have a hearing and the question will be what have you done, and somebody won't like it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Woods, I wish you well in your new endeavor, whatever that may be.

Mr. WOODS. Well, intellectual and proprietary; I am hoping that Ambassador Cohen and I can perhaps start something of our own in a month or two.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The odd couple.

Mr. WOODS. Yes. Something like that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you again, sir. You have been very helpful.

Mr. WOODS. Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



# MARKUP OF H.R. 4541, TO AUTHORIZE ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to other business at 2:40 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry L. Johnston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. The Chair will interrupt the hearing at this point for consideration of House Resolution 4541 which the Clerk will report.

The CLERK. H.R. 4541, a bill to authorize assistance to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Without objection, further reading of the bill is dispensed with and it will be printed in the record in full and open for amendments at this point.

[The information appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. I have a brief opening statement on the markup. The African Conflict Resolution Act is a comprehensive program through which the United States can help address the tragedy of war in Africa. A relatively small U.S. investment in Africa could help save lives and help the United States avoid huge future expenditures; as I said earlier, \$1.5 billion in Somalia alone by war-related humanitarian disasters.

The need for expensive and controversial United Nations intervention would also diminish if African institutions develop the ability to resolve African conflicts. In the last two decades between 2 and 4 million Africans died because of war. There were 5.2 million refugees and 13.1 million displaced persons in Africa in 1993 alone.

Many Americans now associate the country of Rwanda with the word, "genocide." In southern Sudan entire tribes and cultures are at risk and the problem is certainly not going away. Looming ongoing conflicts threaten millions more in Africa. War has also caused untold damage to economic and developing programs. Much of African famine is war-related. Literally, billions of dollars of economic assistance has produced minimal results in war-ravaged countries such as Liberia, Somalia and Sudan.

Demobilization of African armies must be the top priority. Over-sized African armed forces threaten political and economic stability while diverting scarce resources from development needs. I believe

that we should view demobilization as a central element in, or even a prerequisite to our development assistance programs.

Regarding the legislation before us, I regard this bill as critical to Africa's future and I intend to proceed on a consensus basis. If the administration or my Republican and democratic colleagues have suggestions before the full committee markup, I will carefully consider them.

This legislation will help build Africa's capability in conflict resolution by authorizing assistance in five areas:

One, assistance to the organization of African Unity, the OAU. This bill authorizes assistance of \$1.5 million per year over a 4-year period to the OAU's new conflict resolution unit. Consistent with the subcommittee's initiative of last year, the administration has already made \$1.5 million of fiscal year 1994 funds available. This 5-year program will provide critical training and infrastructure to the OAU.

Two, assistance to subregional organizations. The bill authorizes assistance of \$1.5 million per year for 4 years to help build the conflict resolution capabilities of subregional organizations in Africa. ECOWAS, SADC, IGADD have shown promise and we believe the United States should consider helping institutionalized mediation capabilities within these organizations.

Three, African demobilization and retraining programs. The bill authorizes a 2-year program of \$25 million per year if conditions in Africa permit this level of expenditures. I understand the administration has some suggestions about the wording of this provision, and I will instruct my staff to work with them before full committee markup.

Four, the fourth plank pertains to training of Africans in conflict resolution and peacemaking and peacekeeping. The bill authorizes the President to establish a program to provide education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for Africans.

Five, finally, the bill provides a 2-year authorization of \$500,000 per year to facilitate the work of nongovernmental organizations that are engaged in mediation efforts in Africa. This legislation is very much in the U.S. national interest. It could help save a great many lives. I point out that we saved 400,000 Somalians from starving to death. It could help alleviate a weighty humanitarian and peacekeeping burden on the international community and I strongly urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. Burton, an opening statement on the bill?

Mr. BURTON. Yes. I think we would all like to see conflict resolution succeed and we would like to see war stopped. Regarding demobilization, the bill brings to mind the Treaty of Versailles and how the world was so bent on making sure there were no wars after the Great World War I and the British sunk their ships and we demobilized and all of our allies demobilized, and we started then selling aircraft engines to Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe and ended up in a war that was worse than World War I.

I don't believe that you will see demobilization stop wars, although I do believe negotiations and conflict resolution is worthy of the effort. I don't think demobilization is going to work in Africa or anyplace else. You are always going to have those problems.

My view is that if we are going to do the job, let's do it right. The amount of funds you are talking about, the approach is not going to be enough to do the job, and I think as a result, the money will in large part be wasted. A better approach, I believe, is for our State Department and the United Nations to work hand in hand to try to head off conflicts as best they can and if they come to the conclusion that our taxpayers' dollars can be wisely spent to save hundreds of thousands or millions of lives to stop a conflict at that time, I think we should start talking about appropriating the money and authorizing the money to be used.

But to do it in this manner I think is an exercise in futility and won't work although I think it is a noble effort.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you. Is there any discussion or any statements in reference to the bill?

Mr. PAYNE. Let me compliment you for introducing this legislation. I think it is too little and won't offer an amendment to increase it because I am sure it will have difficulty, but I think it is a step in the right direction. Hopefully, we can get to the point where it would be adequate. I believe if there was an adequate fund, we would not still be waiting for a plan in Rwanda. There could be action taken by protective corridors and other kinds of action that would have at least preserved the innocent people, not necessarily saying to get involved in the actual fighting, but at least innocent women and children and persons could have been protected from the onslaught.

I think this is definitely a step in the right direction. I commend you for your bill.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, I agree that I think it is the right thing to do. I think it will offer almost instant relief and a start in the right direction before these conflagrations get completely out of control. It is built for action and I compliment you on being the author of such an important bill.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is there any more discussion on the bill? If not the question is on adoption of the bill.

All those in favor, signify by saying aye.

Opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it and the bill is agreed to. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded to other business.]





# APPENDIX

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TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS  
GEORGE E. MOOSE  
BEFORE

THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE  
8 June 1994, 2:00 PM

## INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to address the Committee on the subject of Conflict Resolution in Africa. It is a central issue for those of us involved in African policy, and one that warrants ongoing attention.

I would like to commend this Committee for its consistent and steady leadership on this issue. Your proposed 1994 legislative initiative, in particular, could prove to be helpful in strengthening our approach to conflict resolution and military downsizing in Africa.

As the poorest region of the world, Africa is also the region most heavily burdened with conflict-generated problems. The costs to the continent of war-related tragedies are easily measured in enormous flows of refugees and displaced persons as non-combatants seek to flee the violence. But the economic, environmental and, most subtly, psychological impact of conflict has taken an immeasurable toll on the lives of the African people. Conflict prevention and resolution, peacemaking, and peacekeeping are ongoing requirements for a continent whose future sways in unpredictable balance.

This Administration has put a premium on conflict resolution issues, making them one of the priorities of President Clinton's foreign policy agenda. Given the growing burden of conflict resolution around the world today, we have also recognized that it has become necessary to look to the utility of regional organizations to handle these very difficult problems. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is in a unique position to defuse conflicts before they start, or conduct early intervention in African conflicts, thereby reducing the magnitude of human suffering and the level of destruction.

We are helping the OAU, as the region's principal political organization, develop a credible capability to plan, coordinate, and supervise efforts in conflict resolution. In FY 94, the U.S. is providing the OAU with \$3.5 million, which consists of \$2 million in non-assessed Peacekeeping Funding to strengthen the OAU's capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations, and \$1.5 million in Economic Support Funding (ESF) to assist the OAU in the development of conflict prevention and mediation measures. Our assistance complements \$3 million that the UN (UNDP) is providing in support of OAU conflict resolution.

Following receipt of the OAU's Concept Paper outlining the organization and operation of the Conflict Resolution Mechanism, the Africa Bureau recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with USAID for the \$1.5 million in ESF money to assist the OAU in the establishment and operation of a civilian conflict resolution/mediation center at the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Disbursal of these funds to the OAU is anticipated in the near future. This money will be used to purchase communications and computer equipment, train civilian staff, and create procedures and software to enhance the OAU's ability to track crisis situations and communicate with OAU representatives in the field.

Funds from the FY 94 voluntary peacekeeping account will provide equipment and training for OAU observer and peacekeeping missions undertaken as directed by the OAU's Conflict Resolution Mechanism activity. Portions of these funds have been expended to support OAU mediation efforts in Burundi and Somalia. The OAU's commitment to this significant mandate expansion is less than a year old, and the Organization is not yet capable of handling a crisis on the scale of the horrors in Rwanda. We believe, however, that active involvement by the OAU member nations and the current Secretary General, Salim Salim, to increase the competence of African states and their regional organization to handle African problems is an effort worthy of continued funding.

#### **CONTINUED FUNDING FOR THE OAU MECHANISM**

Building on the conflict resolution initiative contained in last year's House authorization bill, the Administration has proposed providing an additional \$5 million to the OAU in fiscal 1995. This figure would provide an additional \$1.5 million in support of conflict prevention and mediation. An additional \$3.5 million would enhance the organization's peacekeeping capabilities. This funding would be used primarily for the further acquisition of communications and protective equipment, vehicles, tents, and field rations.

In addition to the proposed support to strengthen the OAU's capabilities, the Administration has also proposed an additional \$10 million in fiscal 1995 regional peacekeeping funding that would provide materiel and training assistance on a bilateral basis to selected African countries to enhance their capabilities to participate in international and regional peacekeeping endeavors. This support will assist the development of credible, well-trained African units capable of participating in conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.

## SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

While we recognize the real and potential contributions of regional organizations, we also have explored the possible contributions of subregional organizations (such as ECOWAS, IGADD and SADC) to conflict resolution, especially in the field of preventive mediation. ECOMOG's peacekeeping effort in Liberia, for example, was undertaken prior to the OAU's accepting responsibility to undertake conflict resolution and has helped restore peace to that country. The ECOMOG effort was subsequently endorsed by the OAU, and the OAU has contributed much to that effort.

We would like to retain the option of channeling our support to the subregional organizations. We do not wish to encourage them to become inadvertent competitors with the OAU for scarce conflict resolution resources. Rather, we would like to ensure that regional mediation and conflict resolution efforts are undertaken in a closely coordinated way.

## DEMobilIZATION

Military downsizing has become a key issue in Africa not only for the U.S. Government, but for a number of other donor governments and for the World Bank. In several cases, African states are demobilizing forces following the resolution of armed conflicts. Another major reason is to reduce the economic burdens that an oversized military places on the resources of a state, or to rationalize the force structure in accordance with a realistic threat assessment. Military downsizing directly supports efforts to enhance democratization in Africa: politicized militaries are often the greatest threat to democracy within African states. In most African countries, for reasons of legitimate security requirements and as a mark of sovereign authority, the military will remain an important national actor. But downsizing and professional orientation can reduce opportunities for the military to engage in political manipulation. Finally, downsizing with reintegration can be an important contribution to the overall economic development of a nation.

Military downsizing in Africa should be viewed as a multi-step process targeted toward family units and communities, rather than as a single event (demobilization) affecting individual soldiers. The downsizing process includes (1) restructuring of the military (often to include a change in the professional culture surrounding the military in question, to include civil-military relations); (2) survey of the retraining/reintegration needs of the personnel to be demobilized; (3) study of the specific local economy; (4) demobilization of selected military personnel; and (5) reintegration of demobilized personnel into the civilian society.

Downsizing and restructuring of the military, coupled with demobilization and successful reintegration of demobilized military personnel into the civil society, is an arduous undertaking, which includes vocational training, pensions and/or discharge payments, transportation/relocation assistance, literacy training, possibly housing construction assistance, and possibly credits to enable veterans to establish a business or go into agriculture. Further, community level health care and educational systems may need to be strengthened to permit these systems to support the increased demands placed on them by demobilized veterans and their families.

For the planning and implementation of downsizing programs we should coordinate with international donors and development banks to share the burden. Within our own government, we should take advantage of the unique skills DoD can provide. Ideally, we would like to be able to provide funding to support plans for military restructuring and downsizing efforts. We should look to and work with USAID and the World Bank for studies of the national economy of the state in question, community level infrastructure enhancement requirements, and the needs assessment survey of those to be demobilized. We are committed to assisting African countries downsize and reintegrate their militaries, and we will continue to support demobilization efforts.

#### **CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING**

Education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for personnel of countries of sub-Saharan Africa are extremely important. DoD is the organization most capable of designing and presenting such a course of instruction. We will undertake to work with our colleagues at Defense to create a conflict resolution and peacekeeping education and training program that can be offered to Africans and other foreign personnel.

#### **SUPPORT FOR NGO's**

There are informal conflict prevention networks in Africa, such as the proposed joint "Africa Reconciliation" effort between the OAU and the Global Coalition for Africa that could provide a framework proceeding on this issue. That program successfully links senior African and international statesmen, with non-governmental organizations to provide experts on mediation for conflict prevention and resolution. Such a network could coordinate its activities with the OAU Secretary General and provide early warning and active mediation of conflict in Africa. Africa already has an established tradition of informal mediation of conflict by eminent figures; providing funding assistance to such efforts could build on that successful tradition. It is an area we will continue to investigate as we study the whole range of conflict resolution and prevention issues.

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING LESSONS LEARNED**

The crises in Angola, Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda demonstrate that international peacekeeping is a critical instrument for both the maintenance of international security and the aversion of humanitarian disasters. Our challenge is to make it more of an effective one.

I believe that the broad outlines of this bill contain some helpful ideas for conflict resolution in Africa. I can promise you that the Administration will carefully consider this and any proposed legislation on conflict resolution in Africa. I look forward to working with the Committee to make our commitment to conflict resolution stronger and more effective. Thank you.

OPENING STATEMENT  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA - JUNE 8, 1994  
CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE

Thank you Mr. Chairman, with the genocide going on in Rwanda, continued civil conflict in Sudan, Angola and Liberia; nothing is more relevant to consider than how we can enable Africa to take charge of resolving their own conflicts. Also political conflicts preventing democratic societies such as we have between Western Sahara and Morocco, and the internal conflicts in Algeria, Nigeria and Zaire are in need of a new approach.

As we depart from the Cold War days when bilateral influence was exerted to counter the moves of the former Soviet Union, we should now look forward to a genuine multilateral approach that enables Africans to be the architects of their own destiny.

I can not stress too strongly the importance providing sufficient financial ~~resources~~<sup>resources</sup> to the Organization of African Unity in order to carry out this responsibility. When we consider the damage done to Africa by pursuing the Cold War, surely appropriate reparations are called for.

It is not practical to sit back and expect African countries that can hardly meet their own payrolls for civil servants to foot the entire bill of the OAU.

More funds are also needed to assist in the demobilization of the large armies that were created to fight the Cold War, namely Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

I have seen the sadness and desperation of these troops in many countries. Sitting, waiting and waiting for an opportunity to return to their homes and receive full employment.

Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on the legislation you are presenting for markup.



The African Conflict Resolution Act to authorize assistance to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa will go along way toward righting many of the wrongs I have cited.

This bill is well thought out and researched. Several authorities have been consulted. The additional 28.5 million dollars in funding this bill will authorize should be easily diverted from less important projects.

I also note that an attempt will be made to further build Africa's indigenous conflict resolution expertise by linking an American and African university to develop a conflict management program in an African university.

Likewise Mr. Chairman, I hope we can involve a Black Land Grant College or some other appropriate African American University in the United States to be a part of this forward looking program. This would be a significant step in furthering black expertise and developing a constituency for Africa here in the United States which we need so very much to develop the public support for greater attention to Africa.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

HEARING ON "CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA:  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS"

JUNE 8, 1994

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES L. WOODS

[DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DECEMBER 1986 - APRIL 1994]

## STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES L. WOODS

MR CHAIRMAN, I THANK YOU FOR THE HONOR OF TESTIFYING TODAY IN MY NEW CAPACITY AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN. AS I BELIEVE YOU KNOW, I RETIRED LAST WEEK FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AFTER THIRTY FOUR YEARS OF SERVICE, THE LAST SIXTEEN WORKING ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS. IT WILL BE REFRESHINGLY DIFFERENT TODAY TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITHOUT BEARING THE WEIGHT OF OFFICIAL POSITIONS AND CLEARANCES.

THAT SAID, I TRUST YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL BE PLEASED TO FIND THAT MY STATEMENT WILL BE VERY BRIEF, FOR THE REASON THAT I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ YESTERDAY THE STATEMENT TO BE SUBMITTED BY MY FRIEND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AND I CAN SAY THAT I AM ENTHUSIASTICALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH IT, AND SEE NO POINT IN REPEATING HIS WELL-REASONED PRESENTATION. IN PRINCIPLE AND IN SPECIFICS, I FIND THE SUB-COMMITTEE'S PROPOSED "AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACT" TO BE APPROPRIATE, TIMELY AND AFFORDABLE; AND I URGE ALL CONCERNED WITH ITS CONSIDERATION TO GIVE IT EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND PASSAGE.

I MIGHT NOTE THAT I HAVE BEEN AN ADVOCATE OF EXTENDING THIS TYPE OF ASSISTANCE TO THE OAU AND TO OTHER AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. IN 1992, THEN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HANK COHEN AND I WORKED TOGETHER TO SPONSOR A "PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION" TO MAKE THE OAU PERMANENTLY ELIGIBLE FOR U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE; THAT "PD" WAS IN FACT SIGNED BY THEN-PRESIDENT BUSH AS FISCAL YEAR 1992 DREW TO A CLOSE, AND WE WERE IMMEDIATELY ABLE TO BEGIN MODEST FUNDING TO THE OAU FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION. AMBASSADOR COHEN WOULD VERY MUCH HAVE LIKED TO BE HERE TODAY, BUT HE IS CURRENTLY IN PARIS. I DID TALK WITH HIM BY PHONE EARLIER THIS WEEK ABOUT YOUR PROPOSED LEGISLATION. HE HAD READ THE DRAFT CAREFULLY AND HE ASKED ME TO STATE FOR THE RECORD THAT HE VERY STRONGLY ENDORSES IT AND HOPES THAT IT WILL COME TO PASS.

LET ME HIGHLIGHT JUST A FEW POINTS:

FIRST, WHILE ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES ARE ENJOINED FROM ENDORSING ANY PARTICULAR CONGRESSIONALLY-PROPOSED "EARMARKS," I AM NO LONGER ENCUMBERED BY THAT OFFICIAL RESTRAINT. I THINK THE NUMBERS IN YOUR BILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, I THINK THE SCALE IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE INTENDED PURPOSES, AND I HOPE THEY WILL BE RETAINED.

SECOND, TO ENSURE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO MOVE SMARTLY ALONG THE TRACK DEFINED BY THIS LEGISLATION, I THINK YOU SHOULD MANDATE OCCASIONAL REPORTS, TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON BEHALF OF THE INTERAGENCY, ON PROGRESS MADE AND PROBLEMS OR OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED. I WOULD THINK THAT SUCH BRIEF REPORTS TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE, EVERY SIX MONTHS, WOULD BE USEFUL TO YOU AND ALSO USEFUL TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN GETTING ITS INTERAGENCY PROCESSES ORGANIZED AND MOVING FORWARD.

THIRD, A FEW CAUTIONS:

- WHAT YOU ARE ASKING TO BE DONE WILL NOT BE EASY, AND IT WILL AT BEST BE DONE SLOWLY AND UNCERTAINLY. THE NECESSITY TO WORK OVER MANY YEARS IS RECOGNIZED IN YOUR LEGISLATION, AND I HOPE THAT THIS IS KEPT IN MIND, AND THAT PATIENCE AND PERSISTENCE ALL AROUND ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE ESSENTIAL. OCCASIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF SETBACK AND FAILURE WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY.

- IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ALL TO KEEP FIRMLY IN MIND THAT WE ARE PROPOSING TO SUPPORT AN INITIATIVE TAKEN ORIGINALLY BY THE OAU ITSELF, AND MORE RECENT INITIATIVES TAKEN BY SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES. WE ARE NOT PROPOSING TO "TAKE OVER" THOSE INITIATIVES, NOR TO PROVIDE AN AMERICAN APPROACH AND AMERICAN SOLUTIONS. I THINK WE CAN HELP THE AFRICANS IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS; BUT WE MUST BE SENSITIVE THAT THEY AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS ARE ALWAYS IN THE LEAD, AND WE ARE IN SUPPORT.

- IN A SIMILAR VEIN, THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ENDEAVOR, INCLUDING THE UN AND ITS SPECIALIZED ORGANS, MANY OTHER COUNTRIES ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AND PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS. WE SHOULD PURSUE THIS

INITIATIVE IN A COLLABORATIVE AND OPEN WAY, AND SEEK TO BUILD A STRONG AND COHERENT COMMUNITY OF CONCERNED ACTORS AND CONTRIBUTORS.

- THIS EFFORT, AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO IT, NEED TO BE PRACTICAL. RESEARCH HAS ITS PLACE, CONFERENCES AND CONSULTATIONS HAVE THEIR PLACE, BUT THIS EFFORT NEEDS TO GO FAR BEYOND ACADEMIC AND DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM LAUNCHED HIS INITIATIVE FORMALLY IN JUNE 1992 WITH, I THINK, A VERY KEEN UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO GO WELL BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL OAU CONSULTATIVE APPROACH. IN SPENDING THE MONIES APPROPRIATED BY THE CONGRESS FOR SUPPORT OF THE OAU TO DATE, AND IN LOOKING AT THE SPECIFICS OF THE APPROACHES YOU ARE RECOMMENDING IN THE "AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACT," I AM IMPRESSED BY THE ATTEMPT TO BE PRACTICAL, TO BE APPLIED, TO BE RELEVANT TO REAL SITUATIONS. AS WE EXTEND THE PROPOSED TRAINING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND MATERIEL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, I HOPE THE BALANCE WILL REMAIN FIRMLY TILTED TO BUILDING PRACTICAL CAPABILITIES THAT CAN BE APPLIED WITHOUT DELAY TO REAL CRISES.

-- CERTAINLY SOME OF THOSE ENHANCED CAPABILITIES WILL BE INTANGIBLE: IMPROVED COLLECTION, SYNTHESIS AND TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION BEARING ON ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS; HEIGHTENED AND MORE SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND APPROACHES THAT MIGHT HEAD THEM OFF; OR COLLEGIAL EXCHANGES OF SENIOR PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT IN THE FUTURE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER IN ADDRESSING A CRISIS. ALL OF THIS IS USEFUL AND WE SHOULD SUPPORT IT.

-- BUT EQUALLY CRITICAL IS BUILDING THE ASSETS THAT NEED TO BE READY TO ADDRESS CRISES AS THEY BUILD AND FLARE: WELL-SCHOOLED AND TRAINED HEADQUARTERS STAFF TO LEAD THE TECHNICAL EFFORT AND DEVELOP OPERATIONAL PLANS; PROPERLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED, PRE-DESIGNATED COMBAT AND SUPPORT UNITS AROUND AFRICA, READY TO GO ON RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE; AND MODEST STOCKS OF ITEMS PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR OBSERVING, MONITORING AND PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS, SUCH AS BINOCULARS, LONG-DISTANCE COMMUNICATIONS, TACTICAL SECURE COMMUNICATIONS,

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS, FIELD RATIONS, FIELD HEALTH AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES, AND GOOD MAPS.

-- IF THIS PROCESS IS SUCCESSFUL, FOUR OR FIVE YEARS FROM NOW, ALL OF THESE THINGS WILL BE IN PLACE, AND THE PARTICIPATING AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS WILL HAVE SUCCESSFULLY BUILT THE BRIDGES FROM THE CONCEPTUAL AND ACADEMIC TO THE PRACTICAL AND THE APPLIED. THE INTERACTION OF THESE VERY DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES CANNOT BUT BE MOST HELPFUL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF BOTH.

A POINT OF POSSIBLE CONCERN IS NOTED IN SECRETARY MOOSE'S STATEMENT, WHERE HE TALKS ABOUT ASSISTANCE TO SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. HIS TESTIMONY EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT ANY FUTURE U.S.G. SUPPORT TO SUCH ORGANIZATIONS WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH THE OAU. THIS APPEARS TO REFLECT CONCERN AT PERHAPS A DILUTION OF OUR SUPPORT EFFORT, PERHAPS CONFUSION OVER ROLES, OR COMPETITION FOR OUR SUPPORTIVE RESOURCES RATHER THAN HELPFUL, COMPLEMENTARY EFFORTS. I TALKED A FEW DAYS AGO TO AMBASSADOR IRV HICKS, SOON TO BE GOING TO ETHIOPIA AS U.S. AMBASSADOR, WHERE HE WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THIS PROCESS; AND HE EXPRESSED SOME SIMILAR CONCERNS.

MY HOPE IS THAT WE WOULD NOT BE TOO DOCTRINAIRE ON THIS ASPECT. I EXPECT THERE WILL BE OCCASIONS WHERE IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE OAU ITSELF SHOULD BE SQUARELY IN THE LEAD; BUT OTHER OCCASIONS WHERE THE LOCAL SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATION MIGHT BETTER BE IN THE LEAD -- INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OAU WOULD HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY DIVIDED AND UNABLE TO ACT OR WOULD ITSELF HAVE ARRIVED AT A PREFERENCE FOR LOCAL REMEDIES FIRST. I AGREE COMPLETELY WITH AMBASSADOR MOOSE'S STATEMENT "THAT REGIONAL MEDIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION EFFORTS [SHOULD BE] UNDERTAKEN ON A COORDINATED, RATHER THAN DISJOINTED, BASIS." BUT LET US NOT, IN ADVANCE, PREJUDGE THAT OUR SUPPORT TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING NEEDS TO BE FILTERED THROUGH THE OAU IN ALL CASES, NOR NECESSARILY BE COORDINATED WITH THE OAU IN ALL CASES. LET US BE PRAGMATIC AND SEE WHAT DEVELOPS, AND WORK DIRECTLY IN SUPPORT OF THESE SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL, AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE, WITH

THE EXPECTATION OF HELPING THEM BUILD LOGICAL AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTING TIES WITH THE OAU.

MR CHAIRMAN, THAT CONCLUDES MY REMARKS. I THANK YOU AGAIN FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR IN SUPPORT OF YOUR PROPOSED LEGISLATION. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS.



[May 25, 1994]

103D CONGRESS  
2D SESSION**H. R.** \_\_\_\_\_

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida (for himself, \_\_\_\_\_) introduced  
the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on  
\_\_\_\_\_

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**A BILL**

To authorize assistance to promote the peaceful resolution  
of conflicts in Africa.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the "African Conflict Reso-  
5 lution Act".

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

2 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following  
3 findings:

4 (1) It is in the national interest of the United  
5 States to help build African capability in conflict  
6 resolution. A relatively small investment of assist-  
7 ance in promoting African conflict resolution—

8 (A) would reduce the enormous human  
9 suffering which is caused by wars in Africa;

10 (B) would help the United States avoid  
11 huge future expenditures necessitated by Soma-  
12 lia-like humanitarian disasters; and

13 (C) would reduce the need for United Na-  
14 tions intervention as African institutions de-  
15 velop the ability to resolve African conflicts.

16 (2) Africa, to a greater extent than any other  
17 continent, is afflicted by war. Africa has been  
18 marred by more than 20 major civil wars since  
19 1960. Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Sudan, Liberia,  
20 and Burundi are among those countries that have  
21 recently suffered serious armed conflict.

22 (3) In the last decade alone, between 2,000,000  
23 and 4,000,000 Africans have died because of war.  
24 There were 5,200,000 refugees and 13,100,000 dis-  
25 placed people in Africa in 1993. In Angola, relief or-  
26 ganizations estimated that 1,000 people were dying

1 each day at the end of 1993. In Rwanda, more than  
2 200,000 people died in less than 5 weeks of fighting  
3 during 1994, while 300,000 people fled to other  
4 countries to escape war.

5 (4) Millions more Africans are currently at risk  
6 of war-related death. Looming or ongoing conflicts  
7 in Zaire, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, and other coun-  
8 tries threaten Africa's future.

9 (5) War has caused untold economic and social  
10 damage to the countries of Africa. Food production  
11 is impossible in conflict areas, and famine often re-  
12 sults. Widespread conflict has condemned many of  
13 Africa's children to lives of misery and, in certain  
14 cases, has threatened the existence of traditional Af-  
15 rican cultures.

16 (6) Conflict and instability in Africa, particu-  
17 larly in large, potentially rich countries such as An-  
18 gola, Sudan, and Zaire, deprive the global economy  
19 of resources and opportunities for trade and invest-  
20 ment. Peace in these countries could make a signifi-  
21 cant contribution to global economic growth, while  
22 creating new opportunities for United States busi-  
23 nesses.

24 (7) Many African armies are far too large,  
25 threatening political and economic stability while di-

1       verting scarce resources from development needs.  
2       Military expenditures in Africa average over twice  
3       the level in Latin America. Demobilization and other  
4       measures to reduce military expenditures are thus a  
5       critical need for many African countries.

6           (8) Conflict prevention, mediation, and demobi-  
7       lization are prerequisites to the success of develop-  
8       ment assistance programs. Nutrition and education  
9       programs, for example, cannot succeed in a nation  
10      at war. Billions of dollars of development assistance  
11      have been virtually wasted in war-ravaged countries  
12      such as Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.

13          (9) Africans have a long tradition of informal  
14      mediation. This tradition should be built upon to  
15      create effective institutions through which Africans  
16      can resolve African conflicts.

17          (10) The Organization of African Unity, under  
18      the leadership of Secretary General Salim Salim, has  
19      established a conflict resolution mechanism and has  
20      been active in mediation and conflict resolution in  
21      several African countries. Various subregional orga-  
22      nizations have also become active in conflict resolu-  
23      tion efforts. These are encouraging developments.

24          (b) UNITED STATES POLICY.—The Congress de-  
25      clares, therefore, that a key goal for United States foreign

1 policy should be to help institutionalize conflict resolution  
2 capability in Africa.

3 **SEC. 3. IMPROVING THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILI-**  
4 **TIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN**  
5 **UNITY.**

6 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.**—The Presi-  
7 dent is authorized to provide assistance to strengthen the  
8 conflict resolution capability of the Organization of Afri-  
9 can Unity, as follows:

10 (1) Funds may be provided to the Organization  
11 of African Unity for use in supporting its conflict  
12 resolution capability.

13 (2) Funds may be used for expenses of sending  
14 individuals with expertise in conflict resolution to  
15 work with the Organization of African Unity.

16 (b) **FUNDING.**—Of the foreign assistance funds that  
17 are allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, not less than  
18 \$1,500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1995 through 1998  
19 should be used to carry out subsection (a).

20 **SEC. 4. IMPROVING CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES**  
21 **OF MULTILATERAL SUBREGIONAL ORGANI-**  
22 **ZATIONS IN AFRICA.**

23 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.**—The Presi-  
24 dent is authorized to provide assistance to strengthen the

1 conflict resolution capabilities of subregional organizations  
2 established by countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as follows:

3 (1) Funds may be provided to such an organi-  
4 zation for use in supporting its conflict resolution  
5 capability.

6 (2) Funds may be used for the expenses of  
7 sending individuals with expertise in conflict resolu-  
8 tion to work with such an organization.

9 (b) FUNDING.—Of the foreign assistance funds that  
10 are allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, up to \$1,500,000 for  
11 each of the fiscal years 1995 through 1998 may be used  
12 to carry out subsection (a).

13 SEC. 5. AFRICAN DEMOBILIZATION AND RETRAINING PRO-  
14 GRAM.

15 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—In order to  
16 facilitate reductions in the size of the armed forces of  
17 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the President is author-  
18 ized to provide assistance for—

19 (1) encampment and related activities associ-  
20 ated with demobilization of such forces, and

21 (2) the retraining for civilian occupations of  
22 military personnel who have been demobilized.

23 (b) FUNDING.—Of the foreign assistance funds that  
24 are allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, \$25,000,000 for  
25 each of the fiscal years 1995 and 1996 should be used

1 for the assistance described in subsection (a), if conditions  
2 permit.

3 **SEC. 6. TRAINING FOR AFRICANS IN CONFLICT RESOLU-**  
4 **TION AND PEACEKEEPING.**

5 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.**—The Presi-  
6 dent is authorized to establish a program to provide edu-  
7 cation and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping  
8 for civilian and military personnel of countries in sub-Sa-  
9 haran Africa.

10 (b) **FUNDING.**—Foreign assistance funds made avail-  
11 able for military education and training activities may be  
12 used to carry out the program provided for in subsection  
13 (a).

14 **SEC. 7. BUILDING MEDIATION CAPABILITY IN AFRICA.**

15 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.**—The Presi-  
16 dent is authorized to provide assistance to nongovern-  
17 mental organizations that are engaged in mediation and  
18 reconciliation efforts in Africa.

19 (b) **FUNDING.**—Of the foreign assistance funds that  
20 are allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, \$500,000 for each  
21 of the fiscal years 1995 and 1996 should be used to carry  
22 out subsection (a).



3 9999 05903 712 5

Committee Report Language.

The Committee continues to believe that conflict resolution should be one of the highest priorities for US foreign policy in Africa. This legislation builds on the conflict resolution initiative contained in last year's House foreign assistance authorization bill.

Section three authorizes the President to provide assistance to strengthen the conflict resolution capability of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU, under the leadership of Secretary General Salim Salim, last year established a new conflict resolution mechanism and approved an enhanced role for the OAU secretariat in conflict resolution. The Committee is encouraged by these developments, and believes US assistance is warranted.

Consistent with the Committee's initiative of last year, the Administration made \$1.5 million of FY 94 funds available for assistance to the OAU. These funds will provide critical computer and communications equipment, negotiation support, and other assistance to the OAU's conflict resolution unit. The Committee highly commends the Administration for its work to date. The authorization of funds for four additional years contained in this section will hopefully enable the OAU to deal with conflict situations effectively.

Section four authorizes the President to provide assistance to strengthen the conflict resolution capabilities of subregional organizations established by countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In recognizing the potential of subregional organizations to contribute to conflict resolution, the Committee especially notes the potential to strengthen the conflict resolution capabilities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

Section five authorizes the President to facilitate reduction in the size of the armed forces of countries of sub-Saharan Africa by providing assistance for encampment and related activities associated with demobilization of forces and for the retraining of demobilized military personnel for civilian occupations. The Committee stresses the importance of providing funding for transportation of ex-combatants to home areas. \$25 million drawn from funds available for sub-Saharan Africa should be spent on demobilization and retraining activities during each of FY 95 and FY 96, if conditions permit. These activities will require a close cooperative relationship between AID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense and should be undertaken in conjunction with the United Nations, international financial institutions, and other bilateral donors.



Section six authorizes the President to establish a program to provide education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for personnel of countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The Committee expects that African military and civilian professionals will receive training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in both the United States and Africa.

To further build Africa's indigenous conflict resolution expertise, the Committee recommends that USIA fund a linkage program between an American and an African university to develop a conflict management program in an African university. The program should help design curricula in the African institution, provide for lecturing and program consultation by American faculty, and provide conflict management training for African faculty. The Committee believes that by institutionalizing Africa's ability to train African experts, the need for US assistance will diminish.

Section five provides funding for independent mediation efforts in Africa. The Committee has two types of activities in view. First, in some cases crisis situations can be best addressed by non-governmental organizations or private mediation efforts. Africa has a long tradition of mediation by eminent figures acting informally, and it is our intent to help Africans build on that tradition.

Second, and further building on African practices, the Committee supports the establishment of an informal conflict prevention network in Africa. Such a network would link senior African and international statesmen, both active and retired, and non-governmental organizations that could provide trained mediation experts. This standing network could provide early warning and prevention of conflicts. The Committee believes the proposed joint venture between the OAU and the Global Coalition for Africa, called "Africa Reconciliation," is a good example of this type of network. The network would coordinate its activities with the Secretary General of the OAU, and its purpose would be to provide early warning and mediation of conflict.



